22 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 15-year Plan

I would like to think of the intelligence business and the participation of the Intelligence Community in the context of a 15-year plan, divided into three 5-year periods with the near term (first 5 years) to be divided up by years, and that the entire 15-year plan would be updated annually. This plan would set forth the anticipated and projected intelligence requirements and objectives for each of the 5-year periods and be thoroughly coordinated to insure appropriate emphasis and de-emphasis in obtaining the stated objectives. It is desired that the staff of CIA prepare a suggested outline for such a 15-year plan for submission to USIB for its consideration and participation in refining the outline and then for their recommendations as to their continuing contributions for various areas of specific interests.

After the planning outline for this 15-year plan is agreed on, it is proposed that it then be completed as an Intelligence Community affair and, as mentioned before, would be updated annually to provide justification and back-up for annual budgets.

The accomplishment of this is just a germ of an idea to do adequate planning on a long term basis to constantly improve and up-date our intelligence capabilities recognizing as we do that unless an integrated plan which is annually updated is available, there will undoubtedly be large gaps in our capabilities because of inadequate participation for the need, in a timely way, of certain capabilities and the provision of this capability.

Dictated by W. F. Raborn, in presence of John M. Clarke

O & 1 - John M Clarke

lcc - DDCI

lcc - ER for reading board via Ex Dir-Compt.

2cc - DCI files.

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20 August 1965

SUMMARY

1. The U.S. in the next five years and the following decade faces the need for greatly increased scope and quality of information vital to its security, clandestine collection must obtain essential information which is not available from SIGINT, overhead recomnaissance and overt human resources. Reliance will be placed on clandestine operations — on the agent — to obtain information in men's minds that reflect the shaping of the plans and intentions of another nation. This is most essential in its relation to early warning.

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- 3. Clandestine counterintelligence through which we learn about the arms, plans, methods and activities of the intelligence organizations of toher countries is a vitally important area in Agency planning. The ever-growing presence of Soviet, Chinese Communist, Cuban and other Communist agents in newer and unstable countries of the world point clearly to the need for increased CIA efforts in this field.
- 4. Covert action, through political and paramilitary capabilities, is likewise an established basic responsibility of the Directorate for Plans.
 When diplomacy fails, covert action programs constitute the only means

short of conventional armed conflict by which the U.S. can contain communism and its aggression in unstable, underdeveloped areas. It appears certain that during the late 1960s and on into the next decade that intensified Soviet and Chinese Communist subversive efforts throughout the world, will call for the best countermeasures that this Agency can produce.

- 5. The one basic resource most essential to the CS is people -not just numbers of people -- but people with unusual and often unique personal qualities, education, experience and outlook who can live and operate effectively in an atmosphere of espionage as agents and as managers of agent operations and under circumstances which severely test their inner resources. It takes time to find and select them. Furthermore, it requires from three to five years to develop in school situations and in on-the-job training here and abroad the unique disciplines that people will need as Clandestine Services professionals. In short, the "bank account" of the Clandestine Services is time and people.
- 6. An urgent need exists for a carefully ordered increase in all phases of the Agency's Clandestine work and every effort must be made to sharpen the disciplines involved and the professional quality of the Service and to provide internally the research required for most effective future operations.
 - 7. It is therefore recommended that:

(1) Approximately

8,	, {	The	manpower	needs	of	the	DD/P	over	th	e nex	t M	lve-year	•
period	be	pro	ovided.	These	regu	iire	ents	are	as :	follo	ws:		

to meet a normal and gradual increase in operating responsibilities,

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25X1A	(2) positions to be used as a contingency								
	development cadre to be available for deployment quickly to								
	critical areas such as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic,								
25X1A	(3) positions for essential increase and im-								
. /	provement of research in support of operations principally in support								
	of penetration operations mounted against the USSR and Communist China.								
	b. That the Directorate for Plans, while remainings fully								
	responsive to the Director's needs for information on its objectives,								
	capabilities and accomplishment as required for his overall management,								
	be allowed to function within CIA with a degree of isolation necessary to								
•	promote a truly clandestine service.								

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SPAM/PAS /eck

13 August 1965

Mr. Kirkpatrick,

I was talking to John Clarke this morning about the general trend of the Long Range Plan report. He asked me to mention to you that it would seem desirable for you to consider oral presentation of the final results to the DCI, backed up by very brief written materials. I would suspect John was suggesting almost an "oral/graphic" presentation. (A summary of the written report)

While I'm sure that you have not overlooked this tactic, I thought it worth mentioning to you.

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	The	recruitmen	t requests	are broken	down as	follows:		
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